What is a just transition for Scotland? The global policy response
Camilla Toulmin describes the term “just transition” and associated concepts, its origins and how it is being translated into policies and institutions in different parts of the world. She reviews experience to date with Scotland’s Just Transition Commission, before highlighting a number of questions for the RSE Environment Community of Interest to consider as areas for further enquiry.
What is a just transition?
Just transition refers to the process by which we as a society, an economy, a system, move from a high to a low impact economy, in a manner which takes into account the consequences for workers and communities of such a transition if specific measures are not in place. While much of the debate today concerns the need to speed up the shift from a carbon-intensive to a low carbon economy for mitigating climate change, the term can also be usefully applied in the case of increased protection of nature and biodiversity.
In the climate field, the term “just transition” is of particular pertinence because of the acceleration needed in cuts to greenhouse gases if the world as a whole is to stay below 2°C and as close to 1.5°C as possible, as agreed at the Paris COP21 in 2015. The text of the Paris Climate Agreement makes reference to governments needing to take “into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs”[2], and the UNFCCC Work Programme includes a focus on just transition pathways, which was established at COP27 in 2022. This is meant “to assess, design and scale up pathways to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement in a way that is just and equitable for all, and leaves no one behind.”
Recent reports such as UNEP Emissions Gap and statements from leading climate scientists make evident the large gap between current emission levels and their trajectory, and what the science tells us we need to achieve to meet the Paris targets. Withdrawal by the new US administration from the Paris Climate Agreement will further widen the emissions gap. Following a heated and fraught set of discussions at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, questions of equity and fairness in the handling of climate goals and financial needs remain paramount in the discussions. The next COP, to be held in Brazil in November 2025, will have a particular focus on “just transitions” – hence, the need to clarify terms and assess progress in putting such ideas into effect.
What might be considered an unjust transition?
The archetypical case involves the closure of coal mines, with the associated loss of jobs, and consequent impacts on communities in these areas. But injustice can also include anything which adds costs to basic commodities, such as food or energy, which affect poorer members of society most. It would also include loss of land taken without proper compensation for solar power or wind turbines, or a big dam for hydropower which takes land and water away from certain users. Equally, it might involve cuts to fossil fuel subsidies, leading to higher cost energy and knock-on impacts especially hitting the poorest groups.
Just transition set within the climate policy context
Just transition (JT) forms part of a cluster of concepts and associated terms in the broad climate policy space. It was originally articulated by the US Labour Movement to address unemployment and the need for re-training in the 1970s, linked to the need to shut-down polluting industries in response to environmental demands. It has subsequently become strongly associated with the consequences of climate policy more globally, such as closure of coal mines, steel furnaces and petrol refineries, and shift towards low carbon intensive activities. Although principally focused on energy and carbon-intensive industry, the JT is also being used to argue for account to be taken of transformations required in other sectors, such as agriculture, as will be described later.
The term “stranded assets” is closely related to JT, and refers to a class of productive assets which are at risk of losing much of their current worth because of a shift in demand, a fall in their market value or a ban on their use. “Stranding” can also refer to people and their particular skills and knowledge, which no longer command their former value or price due to a change in policy and markets, and who consequently feel “left behind”. Stranded assets include reserves of fossil fuels which can no longer be sold because, for example, a carbon tax renders their price uncompetitive, or there is a formal ban on the use of fuels like coal. Stranded assets can also include buildings, vehicles and factories which no longer conform to energy or emission standards, and can only be refitted at a prohibitive cost. One could also refer to “stranded communities”, such as former coal-mining villages, whose livelihoods have disappeared due to climate-focused policy measures.
Net zero (NZ) represents a situation in which any emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) are completely balanced by an equivalent quantity of GHG being sequestered by, for example, an area of land being planted with trees. Many countries, corporations and other entities have committed to becoming NZ by a specific date, such as 2030, 2045, 2050. Such NZ targets are usually accompanied by plans showing how this target might be reached, the investments required, and associated policy measures. Increasingly, NZ is now often accompanied by the term “nature positive” which, while lacking a clear definition to date, describes a situation in which biodiversity and nature parameters are improving. However, NZ is regarded with suspicion in the climate movement, as it allows for substantial offsetting of carbon emissions rather than achieving absolute cuts in greenhouse gases. Offsets, such as Carbon Capture and Storage or purchase of forest carbon, are seen as “false solutions” since they are frequently unreliable, short-term and at times fraudulent.
It is recognised that the pathway to NZ will create both winners and losers and, hence, pose the risk that people and commercial interests likely to be damaged by this shift will seek to block or slow down the energy transition. Unless the energy transition is popular, bringing benefits to the large body of the population, it will not be possible to overcome resistance from corporations and politicians. Given the primacy of accelerating progress towards NZ, justice must therefore be at the core of the energy transition process, since without justice the transition will not happen. This means ensuring that those losing jobs can find better work, while other losers can be compensated or bought off for the losses they suffer and, consequently momentum builds in favour of these changes. Examples include state investment in new technology to ensure, for example, a shift from blast furnaces to electric-arc technology in steel making, and subsidies on electric cars. Equally, EU funds have been paid to coal-mining communities in Poland to ensure the planned closure of mines would not be resisted and, therefore, the EU as a whole could meet their ambitious 2030 targets.
The extent to which significant subsidies are needed depends on the scale and speed of transition demanded. When targets are set in the distant future such as 2050, it will be easier to taper the intervention at little or no impact. It is important to design long-term credible and consistent targets, such that people and businesses can plan for such a shift, so that social and technical changes take place at a similar rate.
The concept of just transition is evident in the UNFCCC negotiations and included in the Paris Climate Agreement, with a number of countries arguing that the shift to low carbon and renewable energy worldwide will adversely impact the value of their natural resources and associated revenue flows. Consequently, they argue, funds should be mobilised to compensate them for this global policy-induced change in asset value. Saudi Arabia has most famously tried out this tactic, though elicited little global sympathy or promises of financial support. Nevertheless, a number of major fossil-fuel producing countries and companies have been active in blocking progress in the international negotiations, especially Saudi Arabia and Russia. Until recently, Australia was also in this “blockers” camp due to their interest in maintaining large-scale production and export of coal. The election of climate-sceptic Donald Trump as 47th President of the USA will also slow the shift to low carbon energy systems, reduce the funds available for investment and adaptation, constrain the production of new scientific advice, and limit the consensus reached at global levels for achieving climate goals. His anti-climate stance has also led to many large corporations pulling out of NZ commitments.
In addition to political blocks to faster climate action, there are also various legal provisions which protect corporate investments from the costs of NZ measures. For example, investment treaties between a multinational company and host government usually include clauses that relate to policy measures which might impinge negatively on the revenue streams anticipated by the investor. Examples include imposition of a carbon tax by government A which could adversely damage the commercial position of an oil and gas company investing in country A. Investors can take the host government to the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Court and demand substantial damages, a threat which acts as a substantial deterrent to initiating energy transition measures. Fossil fuel companies have been the main beneficiaries of cases at the ISDS court, gaining hundreds of billions of dollars in compensation[3].
Fossil-fuel subsidies: One element common in most JT plans includes removal or phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies. In some cases, this has led to prices rising several times over, such as in Nigeria in 2023. Governments usually seek a degree of protection for low-income groups through, for example, increased cash transfers for the poor. Nonetheless, fuel price protests have left their mark, as seen in the reluctance of UK government to reinstate the fuel duty escalator abandoned in 2011. Equally, in 2018 the gilet-jaune protests against the rise of petrol prices and reduction in speed limits in rural areas of France surprised central government by its intense and widespread nature. President Macron’s government was forced into cancelling the increased fuel taxes and raising the minimum wage. A gradual phasing out of subsidies is likely to work better than a single complete cut.
Despite reforms to fossil fuel subsidies in a number of countries, the IMF reports a total of US$7trn is still being spent globally to support fossil fuel production and consumption. As reported by Black et al (2023), “underpricing for local air pollution and global warming account for nearly 60 percent of global fossil fuel subsidies and underpricing for supply costs and transportation externalities (such as congestion) explain another 35 percent (the remainder is accounted for by forgone consumption tax revenue). By fuel product, undercharging for oil products accounts for nearly half the subsidy, coal another 30 percent, and natural gas nearly 20 percent (underpricing for electricity accounts for the remainder). By region, East Asia and the Pacific accounts for nearly half of the global subsidy. By country, in absolute terms China remains the biggest subsidizer of fuels, followed by the USA, Russia, EU, and India. Fully reforming fossil fuel prices by removing explicit fuel subsidies and imposing corrective taxes such as a carbon tax would reduce global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 43 percent below ‘business as usual’ levels in 2030 (34 percent below 2019 levels). This would be in line with keeping global warming to ‘well below’ 2°C and towards 1.5°C.”
However, the imposition of carbon taxes and cuts in subsidies will only work if they are introduced gradually and alongside alternative ways for people to carry out their activities. So, carbon taxes on fuel for cars should be tapered upwards in line with the availability of electric vehicles, thus driving people to buy the more economical option, but this kind of strategic policy design and implementation is rarely developed explicitly.
Just transition processes across the world.
A number of countries have drawn up JT policy and plans, which include Scotland, Indonesia, Canada, Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Brazil, and India, while others have similar mechanisms such as the JT mechanism in the EU, and the US Green New Deal. JT plans are usually associated with plans to achieve NZ.
The South African Just Energy Transition Programme (JETP) was set up by President Cyril Ramaphosa’s Climate Commission. Its international partnership was launched at COP26 in Glasgow in November 2021, and brought together the UK, the Energy Transition Commission, USA[4], EU, France, Germany and World Bank with a funding envelope of $8.5bn for the period 2023-27. It plans to support the phased shut-down of coal-fired power stations which currently account for more than 80% of South Africa’s electricity generation, expand low carbon power sources, and invest in the expansion of green industry and employment.
Today, the South African government argues that there is not enough international finance being invested in the JTP and too much of the existing finance is in the form of loans, rather than grants. Others would point the finger at Eskom, the national utility responsible for energy generation and distribution, which has been a vehicle for some politicians to get rich through corrupt practices by control of procurement. To date, Eskom has shown little interest in moving away from its long-standing model of centralised coal-fired power generation towards a more distributed pattern of renewables. It is only in the last 12-18 months that there has been positive encouragement of Independent Power Purchase agreements, that recognise and reward electricity generators, and encourage development of large solar power stations. The powerful position of Eskom is illustrative of electricity utilities in many other countries around the world, which had become used to monopoly control over the power sector. This gave them great political and financial weight, including extensive possibilities for exercise of patronage, particularly evident during the Zuma Presidency in South Africa.
The principles and purpose of South Africa’s JETP are similar to those elsewhere and include:
Indonesia’s JETP was launched in November 2022, with an International Partners Group (IPG) on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Bali. The IPG comprises the governments of Japan, USA, Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Germany, France, Norway, Italy, and UK. An initial commitment of US$20 billion, of which US$10 billion in IPG funding, was pledged to catalyze US$10 billion of private financing from the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ). JETP Indonesia marks the largest energy transition financing package in the world to date. Its immediate objective is to develop a Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan (CIPP), intended to bring in both public and private finance. For Indonesia, energy transition is a key step to meet the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets, and realize its ambition to build a low-carbon economy. This transition actively supports Indonesia’s industrialization trajectory while decoupling the long-standing historical correlation between economic growth and emissions.
India’s approach to the just transition
India’s energy transition is very challenging, given it is the second largest consumer of coal globally. Coal accounts for 55% of the country’s energy needs and there are many workers dependent on the fossil fuel sector and ancillary industries, predominantly informal workers. A transition away from fossil fuels could lead to new livelihood opportunities, diversified economic activities and more sustainable pathways of energy generation. But on the other hand, the transition is likely to exacerbate the vulnerability of those reliant on fossil fuel or mineral extraction supply chains[5]. A comprehensive policy framework is needed to protect affected people and communities, keeping in mind geography, demography, and social factors. Other hurdles include lack of access to affordable financing and credit instruments, and weak institutions through which to deploy capital and investment for alternative livelihood opportunities. Since informal workers constitute the majority of the workforce engaged in coal mining and mineral extraction industries, formal laws often do not have necessary provisions to safeguard their interests.
As noted by the Grantham Institute, London School of Economics, which has established a Just Transitions Lab, building a net zero and climate-resilient economy represents a strategic opportunity for India to deliver inclusive growth and make the country a green jobs superpower. But there will also be profound socioeconomic consequences from the transition. While there is considerable scope for more and better jobs from building a net zero economy, there is also a risk of stranding people and assets in high-carbon sectors such as coal, and of a narrow greening of the economy that does not take people into account. To achieve the scale of transformation required an unprecedented volume of capital, both public and private, must be mobilised, from domestic sources and internationally. A just transition in India is a global imperative, given the scale of the country, its large workforce in threatened sectors and its vulnerability to climate change impacts.
The specific circumstances of each country’s situation means that the energy transition needs to be country-led and country-owned, recognising the need to include diverse interests in the process. There are also questions of credibility and commitment which will be tested over the next few years given current climate scepticism in the White House.
Scotland’s just transition experience.
A just transition commission (JTC) was set up by the Scottish government in 2019, following a successful advocacy campaign by STUC and Friends of the Earth Scotland, which had established the Just Transition Partnership in 2016. The Just Transition Partnership (JTP) advocates for action to meet climate change targets in ways which protect workers’ livelihoods and make Scotland more equal and inclusive, by the creation of high quality employment opportunities in the new or expanded sectors which are needed at the core of the transformed Scottish economy.
Formally, the Commission has been tasked with:
- providing scrutiny and advice on the ongoing development of Scottish Government led just transition plans, including the application of the Just Transition Planning Framework
- advising on the most suitable approaches to monitoring and evaluation
- undertaking meaningful engagement with those most likely to be impacted by the transition, hearing from a broad range of representative voices and advising on how to ensure these can shape and contribute to just transition planning work in Scotland
- engaging and collaborating with other sources of expertise, including relevant Scottish Government advisory bodies and relevant programmes of work (including, but not limited to the Committee on Climate Change, the Poverty and Inequality Commission, Fair Work Convention, the Council of Economic Advisors and the development of the National Strategy for Economic Transformation)
- publishing an annual report to reflect on Scotland’s progress.
The purpose of the JTC is thus to provide independent advice to government on how to maximize the social and economic benefits of decarbonizing Scotland, given its NZ target date of 2045. The JTC’s work focuses on ensuring that the transition to a low-carbon economy is fair and equitable for everyone. This first JTC worked from 2019-2021 and was chaired by Prof Jim Skea, now Chair of the IPCC. The JTC is currently in phase 2, running from 2021 to the end of the current parliament expected in May 2026. This second JTC is co-chaired by Professor Dave Reay (climate science) and Satwat Rehman (social justice and inequality), with an independent secretariat hosted by the Scottish Government made up of 3 civil servants seconded from government. The JTC has 20 commission members drawn from business, industry, trade unions, environmental groups, the third sector and academia, and meets 4-5 times a year.
Some have argued for the JTC to be put on a statutory basis, which would give it added independence and powers, including to report to the Scottish Parliament, enabling it to hold the Scottish government to account. Currently it reports to the Energy and Climate Change Directorate of the Scottish Government. But for the JTC to have real impact, it needs to have effective cross-government connection, since almost every sector has implications for GHG emissions. And some have argued that if the JTC becomes a statutory body, it would then control the levers needed to effect change and investment in new infrastructure.
If Scotland is to achieve NZ by 2045, it is estimated that low carbon investment needs to increase fivefold over the period 2025-2030, in the fields of energy, transport, housing and land use. Government has a central role to play in securing this investment through long-term consistent policy, mobilising funding from the Scottish National Investment Bank, negotiating conditionalities with foreign investors, green procurement policies, and support to R&D. However, there are serious doubts about whether this fivefold increase in investment and associated policies will actually happen, given in April 2024, the government announced it was scrapping its climate goals for 2030 and 2040, and would move to a five-year cycle of targets. This was widely seen as a response to limited and late policy measures focused on investing in a low carbon economy, and poor follow-through in terms of implementation. Such actions confirm the oft-noted tendency for Scotland’s government to be replete with plans but short on implementation.
As noted by the UK CCC, “continued delays to the updated climate change plan and further slippage in promised climate policies mean that the Climate Change Committee no longer believes that the Scottish Government will meet its statutory 2030 goal to reduce emissions by 75%. There is no comprehensive strategy for Scotland to decarbonise towards Net Zero…. The Scottish Government delayed its draft Climate Change Plan last year despite the 2030 target only being six years away. This has left a significant period without sufficient actions or policies to reach the target; the required acceleration in emissions reduction in Scotland is now beyond what is credible.”[6] The Interim Chair of the UK CCC adds: “Scotland has laudable ambitions to decarbonise, but it isn’t enough to set a target; the Government must act. There are risks in all reviewed areas, including those with significant policy powers devolved to the Scottish Government.”
There are a number of critical areas for NZ and JT in Scotland. These include creation of good quality jobs in the renewable energy supply chain, questions of skills, training and apprenticeships in the practical expertise required for green energy installation, home insulation, nature-based and land management, digital industry, infrastructure and construction.
Grangemouth, Scotland’s only crude oil refinery
The Ineos-China refinery at Grangemouth has been presented as a particular hotspot for government action to address what a “just transition” might require. The refinery was opened in 1924 and expanded into petrochemicals in the 1950s. It has served as the primary supplier of aviation fuel for Scotland’s main airports, while being a major supplier of petrol and diesel fuels across the Central Belt. Ineos acquired the site in 2005 and is responsible for the entire plant, while the refinery itself is owned by PetroIneos – a joint venture between Ineos and PetroChina.
As Scotland’s only oil refinery, it is set to close by the summer of 2025, with the loss of 400 jobs. However, PetroIneos say the closure of Grangemouth is for purely commercial reasons, and has nothing to do with Scotland’s climate policy, the refinery being unable to compete with lower-cost sites in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Instead, the site will be converted into a terminal able to import petrol, diesel, aviation fuel and kerosene into Scotland – but will require a workforce of fewer than 100 employees compared to the current 475. Union leaders had hoped the facility could remain open longer to provide time for a green alternative to be established at the site. Workers said the announcement was a “kick in the teeth” while unions labelled it a “terrible indictment” of the Westminster and Holyrood governments and of the company.
The UK Government has been working with the Scottish Government to deliver an investment plan that could secure Grangemouth’s industrial future and protect its skilled workforce, which includes:
- £100 million package: to support the community and its workers, investing in local energy projects to create new opportunities for growth in the region; Tailored support that will help affected workers in finding new employment; and Investment in the site’s long-term future, by identifying credible options to begin building a new long-term industry at the refinery site, including low carbon hydrogen, clean eFuels and sustainable aviation fuels.
However, this plan offers too little and too late. As of mid-March 2025, major job losses are underway, demonstrating the slowness of government’s policy and delivery.
Aberdeen and North East Scotland
For Aberdeen, the challenge is how to deliver an inclusive and just energy transition for all in an energy city that has been built on oil and gas for over 50 years. A global and local partnership of major public and private organisations has been established to engage with people in and around Aberdeen city, and co-create a pragmatic “bottom up” human-centric action plan. If all goes well, it is hoped that lessons learned in Aberdeen from this approach can be exported across the globe. The Scottish government has established a £500 million, 10-year Just Transition Fund to accelerate the energy transition in Aberdeen and the North East, and establish the region as a world-leader in the transition to a net zero economy. The NESCAN–Just Transition Communities Project brings together local partners which include Aberdeen University and a range of community and business groups. However, to date, progress is limited, and there are concerns about a lack of monitoring and evaluation of what has been achieved.
The UK government’s establishment of GB Energy headquarters in Aberdeen should ensure the city remains a key hub for energy expertise, and the development of clean energy finance and skills.
Assessing progress: Scotland’s JTC published its Annual Report[7] in December 2024 with annexes covering PetroIneos Grangemouth, Shetlands, and Investment for transitions. Its summary concludes:
“A gap remains between the abstract aspiration for just transition frequently referred to at the centre and the lived realities of people around the country. The strengths of the formal process we are committed to are undermined by a pattern of delays to core elements of our climate process as a whole, lack of effective leadership on this agenda, the continued lack of adequate capacity and ongoing challenges in effectively mainstreaming just transition as a top priority across government. Over the past several years we have heard directly from people whose livelihoods, communities, businesses and places urgently need to see just transition principles put to work meaningfully as they navigate the major changes and challenges being experienced across the country.”
The JTC has just published a report to assess progress with its activities and impact on the transition process in Scotland – Measuring and Evaluating Success in the Scottish Just Transition – Just Transition Commission which includes questions on the status and powers of the JTC.
The Just Transition Partnership (STUC + Friends of the Earth Scotland) are also clear in their assessment that “we can reflect on another year of ‘business as usual’ in Scotland. Very little positive progress towards creating the just transition which Scotland needs can be reported…. The Scottish Government appears to have lost momentum, with the Energy Strategy and the three sectoral Just Transition Plans still unpublished. There has not been a further round for applications for the Just Transition Fund in the North East and the Offshore Skills Passport remains in development. A document entitled ‘Green Industrial Strategy’ has been published, but we don’t think that it merits that title. In fact, we think that its emphasis on inward financial investment and the market-based approach embodied in it are part of the problem, not the solutions, for Scotland’s industrial communities.”[8]
Just transitions in the rural domain
To achieve net zero, the land use and agricultural sectors are also required to reduce GHG emissions, for example through changes to land cover, increased sequestration of carbon in soils and vegetation, reductions in use of chemical fertiliser, reductions in the number of cattle kept and changes to their feed management. Examples include Ireland’s National Dairy Council with a heavy focus on the dairy sector, and New Zealand’s large sheep numbers.
However, such changes are not uncontested. For example, there is growing opposition to reductions in cattle numbers in the Netherlands, where farmers took to the streets in 2024 and have been voting for a new Farmer-Citizens party in protest. There are also growing questions around forest carbon, the credibility of carbon offsets, and adverse impacts from major afforestation schemes around the world. While Article 6 of the UNFCCC was agreed in Baku in November 2024, allowing for a ramping up of carbon market activity between companies and countries, serious worries remain about additionality, permanence, environmental and social impacts, and the allocation of carbon revenues from such schemes. In the case of Scotland, major public funding support to forestry schemes has led to rising land prices and a rapid increase in tree planting, provoking disquiet in rural communities who feel the landscapes they know well are being transformed for the worse, rural upland jobs are being lost, and there is a decline in biodiversity and tourism potential[9]. The distributional impacts of these and other environmental schemes are also seen to be questionable, with the Renewable Heat Incentive and rewilding schemes largely benefitting those with large, landed estates[10].
The JTC co-chairs report that during their visits to various parts of Scotland they have become a lightning rod for dissatisfaction and often face an avalanche of complaint from rural groups who feel they have no voice to push back on large wind farms or commercial forestry schemes. Local perspectives need to be taken seriously and solutions sought which balance local and national interests. At the same time, the government needs to be clear about the direction of travel and what this means for changes to land use and management.
Just transition and financial frameworks.
UK government has been keen to establish the City of London as a foremost hub for Transition finance. The Transition Finance Market Review was established in 2023 to explore ways in which green finance could support the goals of decarbonisation across high-emitting sectors. A Transition Plan Taskforce has been established alongside plans for a National Wealth Fund and the Great British Energy Bill, all interlocking parts of the UK government’s policy. There are numerous questions arising from this approach, which include the design of regulations needed to accelerate finance in this field, agreement of a taxonomy to clarify what constitutes “green” investment, whether corporate transition plans should become mandatory, and what role should be played by government in shaping and co-investing in green industrial policy.
Questions for the RSE Environment Community of Interest to consider
What is the best status for Scotland’s JTC, and its relationship with government?
Can a non-statutory body provide effective scrutiny of the NZ process? In the UK, the statutory body – the Climate Change Committee (CCC) – assesses and reports on UK-wide and nation-led actions towards achieving climate targets. In Scotland, JTC reviews the success or otherwise of how well climate policy is designed to maximise benefits from actions taken, but a statutory role would increase its powers and ability to hold government to account. This could help bridge the large gap between policy ambition and practical implementation.
How fast should we transition to NZ?
The speed of transition to net zero matters greatly. The earlier emissions are reduced, the closer will be our pathway to 1.5°C and the shorter the time around 2°C warming, thereby reducing the risks of escalating feedbacks and tipping points in the climate system. A faster transition will thus reduce exposure to climate risks, especially for the poor both in Scotland and globally. However, a rapid shift from high to low carbon energy systems may cause greater short-term disruption in jobs, investment flows, and energy prices and thereby generate greater political pushback. At the same time, we should accelerate phase-out of the most potent greenhouse gases.
What does government need to do in order to implement a NZ and JT strategy?
NZ strategies are usually framed by a date such as 2045 or 2050, the idea being that setting a distant date will enable a phased approach, allowing businesses and investors to wind-down carbon intensive technologies and build up low carbon equivalents. Ideally, government sets out a tapered approach to regulations, subsidies, re-training and other measures to ensure long-term consistent messaging and incentives for transition. However, the distant date taken often reduces political pressure on government to deliver tangible steps in the near term, with implementation plans either lacking or with weak accountability as regards delivery[11]. In the case of Scotland, how can one account for the gap between bold ambitious policy statements and limited implementation? What might be a limited number of key indicators by which to assess progress in the most critical areas?
How far is the JTC process linked to decisions driving economic growth?
For countries reliant on fossil fuel extraction and revenues, how easy is it for the JT/NZ policy to prevail over well-established entrenched interests? In the case of Nigeria, for example, the JTC is led by the Ministry for the Environment, which has little effective political power or leverage, in contrast to the oil and gas ministry which drives exploitation of the country’s petroleum reserves. The latter generate 90% of exports and 70% of government revenue. Consequently, the government machine listens much more to the Ministry for Oil and Gas, rather than the JTC process. In the case of Scotland, how far does climate policy drive the agenda for jobs, investment, and industrial development? How might the Green Industrial Strategy[12] document provide Scotland with a clearer framework and set of policy tools within which to set the JT process?
Do the multiple agendas intertwined with the JT process make it easier or slower to achieve mitigation?
While the main force driving NZ plans and associated JT processes in Scotland has been the need for accelerated actions to cut GHG emissions, there are a number of other agendas which have become closely linked to these. First is the desire to use the push for net zero as a means to achieve a fairer society at national and global levels. Second is the recognition that achievement of NZ will be much delayed if those suffering the costs of transition to a low carbon economy see no benefit from this shift, are able effectively to block progress, and must be “bought off” in some fashion. Third, for those who currently have no access to electricity, “transition” means little to them, whether just or unjust. Consequently, something additional needs to be done for the 50% of Africa’s population which does not yet have any access to power. Fourth, how far should the concept of JT include questions of vulnerability to climate change and support for adaptation and resilience measures[13]? Fifth, should the JTC broaden its scope to cover Scotland’s transition to “Nature-Positive” status, the changes required of land-use to achieve improvements in biodiversity parameters, and consequences for the incomes, jobs and landscapes of rural communities?
Where does JT sit in relation to legal, moral, or economic forces?
There are interesting questions around what people can claim from government as their legal or moral due. There is a fundamental asymmetry between the treatment given to windfalls versus adverse impacts. In the former case, government may try and claw back some part of the unearned benefit (such as a tax on windfall profits for energy companies benefiting from high world oil prices) but there is no presumption in favour. Whereas in the case of adverse impacts caused by a major policy change, the affected parties are on firmer ground to sue for compensation. The case of the proposed coal-mine in Cumbria provides an interesting example, in which the easiest and cheapest course for government was to refuse it planning permission, rather than to allow it to set up and then be forced to compensate the mine-owners for being shut down. In a dynamic, changing economy there will always be people who gain and others who lose. Should any adverse damage to an individual or group be compensated, where it has been led by a change in government policy, or is it predominantly those who can threaten, block, hire lawyers and exert political heft who are able to demand redress? It should also be noted, as is made clear from a study of energy transitions over the last 50 years in the UK that there are many positive aspects from these shifts in economy and employment. While previous transitions created economic insecurity for coal-mining communities, they also established new opportunities in a range of new energy sectors[14].
How broad should the boundaries be drawn for assessing policy impacts and redistributive mechanisms?
JT processes are usually designed and carried out within the nation state, where domestic resources can be re-distributed from winners to losers. Several regional JT frameworks exist, such as that of the EU where existing mechanisms for directing funds to less favoured areas can be re-purposed for JT payments. At global level, the UNFCCC provides a setting for negotiations over the scale of climate finance needed for different purposes – mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage. While much of the JT debate is set within the expected losses to fossil fuel producers and employees, there are also important gains to be made from holdings of critical minerals needed for the green, digital technology revolution. Thus, for example there is considerable interest in re-establishing old mines and opening up new mining areas which can deliver cobalt, copper, tantalum, lithium and many other critical minerals. With demand for such minerals expected to triple by 2030 and quadruple by 2040, and large sums to be made from extraction and processing, there are key questions about how the revenues from increased demand will be distributed between all the different actors in the value chain. Would it be right and fair for those benefitting from increased windfall revenues from “green minerals” to pay compensation to fossil fuel exporters being put out of business?
How best to connect RSE and other Scottish expertise with Scotland’s JTC and the broader question of setting and complying with climate change targets?
The recent detailed submission from the RSE in response to the NZET Committee consultation on Scotland’s Climate Change Targets shows the depth of knowledge and engagement RSE can offer. And the RSE inquiry into public financial support for tree planting and forestry provided a trenchant assessment of the public benefit from continued subsidy towards commercial conifer plantations. Can we offer a more regular commentary and assessment of the government’s NZ and JT actions? How to join with other major sources of expertise in this field, such as the Just Transition Partnership, the Just Transitions Initiative[15] and London School of Economics’ Grantham Institute.
Resources on just transition.
Just Transition Commission. Conditions for Success Annual Report 2024
Scottish Government’s consultation call November 2024 Grangemouth’s just transition – gov.scot
Workers’ Perspectives on Energy Transitions in Britain, Ewan Gibbs for the Just Transition Partnership. www.jtp.scot
https://scga.scot/2024/12/12/mapping-just-transition/
On the speed and scale of the energy transition globally, offering a sceptical (or possibly realistic) view : The Energy Transition That Couldn’t by Richard Haass & Carolyn Kissane – Project Syndicate
References
[1] I am very grateful to a number of readers who provided critical comments on this note including Roger Crofts, James Curran, Matthew Crighton, Ian Boyd, Peter Higgins, Des Thompson, Clive Mitchell.
[3] Cotula, L. and Berger, T. (2024). Submission to the OECD consultation on aligning investment treaties with climate action. IIED, London https://www.iied.org/22581g
[4] Now withdrawn, and cancellation of >US$1bn in funding.
[5] India’s TERI has set up a Just Transitions programme to explore inclusive pathways to NZ Just Transition
[6] Scotland’s 2030 climate goals are no longer credible – Climate Change Committee
[7] Just Transition Commission. Conditions for Success Annual Report 2024
[8] Hoping for progress in 2025, after disappointment in 2024
[9] Scotland’s ‘industrial-scale’ forestry triggers opposition in border town
[10] RSE-inquiry-into-public-financial-support-for-tree-planting-and-forestry-2024.pdf
[11] As noted by recent reports, there is a need for greater accountability for delivery right across Government, established timelines, performance indicators, named responsible officers, etc. eg https://audit.scot/publications/public-service-reform-in-scotland-how-do-we-turn-rhetoric-into-reality and https://cerg.scot/new-report-stepping-up-to-delivery/#:~:text=CERG’s%20new%20report%20invites%20the,to%20climate%20change%20fast%20enough.
[12] Green Industrial Strategy
[13] Or perhaps questions of JT are a subset of wider environmental justice concerns. As noted by Clive Mitchell of Nature Scot, distributive justice is both spatial and temporal. Actions taken in one place will have consequences for those elsewhere, and actions today may have ramifications for the future. Just Transition needs to recognise historical aspects of responsibility, as well as addressing the future of more carbon-intensive sectors of the economy. Decisions made today have major distributional consequences, since a more rapid path to NZ will cause less damage to land and livelihoods of poor groups both in Scotland and worldwide.
[14] Home Page – Time for a Just Transition
[15] https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/law/research/justtransitions/
